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THE NEW BATSON: OPENING THE DOOR OF THE JURY 
DELIBERATION ROOM AFTER PEÑA-RODRIGUEZ V. COLORADO 
JAROD S. GONZALEZ* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Secrecy in jury deliberations is an important aspect of the American jury 
system. In both criminal and civil jury trials, what goes on in the jury 
deliberations room generally stays in the jury deliberations room.1 It is very 
difficult to impeach a jury verdict and get a new trial based on internal 
deliberations—what jurors say to each other during the course of formal 
deliberations.2 There are very good reasons for the no-impeachment rule: the 
need for finality in jury determinations and for jurors to have free and open 
discussions among themselves about the case, to name a few.3 Yet, a strict 
application of the no-impeachment rule could be problematic. There is a valid 
countervailing concern that improper juror statements or behavior during jury 
deliberations could undermine the fairness of a trial when such statements 
influence the verdict, perhaps implicating due process, equal protection, and 
fundamental justice concerns.4 Recognizing that the jury system as a human 
 
* Copyright © 2017, Jarod S. Gonzalez, Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law; 
B.B.A., summa cum laude, University of Oklahoma, 1997; J.D., with highest honors, University of 
Oklahoma College of Law, 2000. 
 1. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267 (1915) (recognizing that the weight of authority in 
federal and state jurisdictions is that a juror cannot impeach his own verdict because of the public 
injury that would occur if jurors were allowed to testify concerning what happened in the jury 
room). 
 2. Sellars v. United States, 401 A.2d 974, 981 (D.C. 1979) (“Courts consistently have 
exercised great caution in allowing jurors to impeach their verdicts.”). 
 3. The rule that a juror may not impeach his own verdict once the jury has been discharged 
was formulated “to foster several public policies: (1) discouraging harassment of jurors by losing 
parties eager to have the verdict set aside; (2) encouraging free and open discussion among jurors; 
(3) reducing incentives for jury tampering; (4) promoting verdict finality; (5) maintaining the 
viability of the jury as a judicial decision-making body.” Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 
F.2d 140, 148 (3d Cir. 1975). 
 4. McDonald, 238 U.S. at 269 (noting that the no-impeachment rule could recognize 
exceptions in the “gravest and most important cases” where exclusion of juror testimony might 
violate principles of justice); United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. 361, 366 (1852) (“[C]ases might arise 
in which it would be impossible to refuse [juror testimony] without violating the plainest principles 
of justice.”). 
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institution cannot, as a practical matter, guarantee every party a perfect trial,5 
should the generally closed-door to the jury deliberations room be opened after 
the trial for consideration of jury misconduct or error that occurred during the 
jury deliberations? 
As a result of the recent United States Supreme Court’s decision in Peña-
Rodriguez v. Colorado, the closed-door to the jury deliberations room has been 
constitutionally cracked open to consider post-trial complaints of juror 
expressions of racial bias during deliberations as a basis for a new trial.6 In Peña-
Rodriguez, the Court held that: 
[W]here a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial 
stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment 
requires that the no-impeachment rule give way in order to permit the trial court 
to consider the evidence of the juror’s statement and any resulting denial of the 
jury trial guarantee.7 
The new Peña-Rodriguez rule constitutionalizes a racial bias exception to the 
no-impeachment rule that had previously been a matter of policy choice among 
the various federal and state jurisdictions.8 
Taking the law as it now stands, this Article explores various issues that are 
likely to arise in all jurisdictions in the wake of the Peña-Rodriguez decision. 
First, this Article examines the history of the no-impeachment rule and the 
various approaches to this rule from an evidence perspective in federal and state 
jurisdictions. Second, the Article explains the Peña-Rodriguez decision that 
makes a constitutional exception to this rule in the context of expressions of 
racial bias during jury deliberations in criminal cases and evaluates the possible 
expansion of this holding to civil cases. Third, the Article explores the future 
development of additional categorical exceptions to the no-impeachment rule 
such as gender bias and religious bias that are protected under the Constitution 
based on the Court’s reasoning in Peña-Rodriguez. Finally, the Article considers 
procedures and standards for implementing the Peña-Rodriguez decision and 
determining whether to grant a new trial based on expressions of racial bias 
during jury deliberations. The fundamental point of this Article is that the Peña-
Rodriguez holding is likely to extend to civil cases, and exceptions beyond race. 
Additionally, procedural rules will be developed in a manner that is consistent 
with how the constitutional Batson exception to peremptory challenges has 
developed over the last thirty years. 
 
 5. Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 87 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) (“While 
every party is entitled to a fair trial, as a practical matter, our jury system cannot guarantee every 
party a perfect trial.”). 
 6. 137 S. Ct. 855, 879 (2017) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 7. Id. at 869 (majority opinion). 
 8. Id. at 865–66. 
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II.  HISTORY OF THE NO-IMPEACHMENT RULE 
Every state and federal jurisdiction follows to a substantial degree the 
concept that jury verdicts cannot be impeached based on what occurs during 
formal jury deliberations.9 This concept originated from the English common 
law rule that jurors could not impeach their verdict through affidavit or live 
testimony.10 The original English common law “Mansfield” rule was a strict rule 
that prohibited jurors from testifying about their subjective mental processes or 
events that occurred during deliberations.11 American jurisdictions have tended 
to follow the Mansfield rule in general but with three slightly different 
approaches. First, Texas applies the “outside influence” rule.12 This approach 
generally protects all juror statements and events during deliberations from 
impeachment of the verdict but permits new trials based on outside influences—
like the threatening of jurors—that affect the integrity of the jury’s decision-
making process.13 In general, an outside influence has to come from a source 
outside the formal deliberation process such as a nonjuror third party.14 Second, 
the federal rules approach permits exceptions to the no-impeachment rule for 
 
 9. Id. at 865 (“Some version of the no-impeachment rule is followed in every State and the 
District of Columbia.”). 
 10. Vaise v. Delaval, 1 T.R. 11, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785). 
 11. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 863 (“The Mansfield rule, as it came to be known, 
prohibited jurors, after the verdict was entered, from testifying either about their subjective mental 
processes or about objective events that occurred during deliberations.”). 
 12. TEX. R. CIV. P. 327(b) (“A juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring 
during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror’s 
mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict concerning his mental 
processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify whether any outside influence 
was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement 
by him concerning a matter about which he would be precluded from testifying be received for 
these purposes.”); TEX. R. EVID. 606(b) (“(1) Prohibited Testimony or Other Evidence. During an 
inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify about any statement made 
or incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or 
another juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment. The court 
may not receive a juror’s affidavit or evidence of a juror’s statement on these matters. (2) 
Exceptions. A juror may testify: about whether an outside influence was improperly brought to bear 
on any juror; or to rebut a claim that the juror was not qualified to serve.”). 
 13. Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 24 S.W.3d 362, 370, 373–74 (Tex. 2000) 
(recognizing that comments made by one juror to another juror during deliberations are not outside 
influences); Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendez, 155 S.W.3d 382, 413 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004), 
rev’d on other grounds, 204 S.W.3d 797 (Tex. 2006) (recognizing that a juror looking up the 
definition of the term “negligence” in a dictionary and communicating the definition with fellow 
jurors during jury deliberations is not an outside influence). 
 14. See Editorial Caballero v. Playboy Enter., 359 S.W.3d 318, 324 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012), cert. 
denied, No. 12-0194 2012 Tex. LEXIS 948 (2012). But see McQuarrie v. State, 380 S.W.3d 145, 
151, 154 (Tex. Crim App. 2012) (noting that information does not have to originate from a non-
juror to be considered an outside influence). 
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testimony about events extraneous to the deliberative process.15 This includes 
outside influences such as juror bribing but also broadens out to include possible 
“extraneous prejudicial information” such as unauthorized juror views of crime 
scenes, juror experiments on the evidence, juror consultation, and juror 
consideration of dictionaries and newspapers.16 Under this approach, extraneous 
prejudicial information could presumably originate from the jurors themselves 
without any connection to a third party. Third, some jurisdictions follow the so-
called “Iowa” rule that prevents jurors from testifying about their own subjective 
beliefs, thoughts, or motives during deliberations but allows jurors to testify 
about objective facts and events that occurred during deliberations based on the 
idea that jurors could corroborate that testimony.17 Of these three different 
approaches, the Texas outside influences rule appears to remain closest to the 
original common law Mansfield rule.18 The federal rules approach also stays 
close to the Mansfield rule.19 Both of these approaches encourage full and frank 
discussions among jurors during deliberations and try to ensure that jurors will 
not have to provide testimony about their verdict or otherwise be bothered by 
litigants seeking to challenge the verdict. The Iowa rule is the most flexible 
approach and errs on the side of protecting litigants from jury misconduct during 
deliberations.20 Within these various approaches, prior to Peña-Rodriguez, at 
least sixteen jurisdictions recognized an exception to the no-impeachment rule 
 
 15. FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (“(1) Prohibited Testimony or Other Evidence. During an inquiry 
into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify about any statement made or 
incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or 
another juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment. The court 
may not receive a juror’s affidavit or evidence of a juror’s statement on these matters. (2) 
Exceptions. A juror may testify about whether: (A) extraneous prejudicial information was 
improperly brought to the jury’s attention; (B) an outside influence was improperly brought to bear 
on any juror; (C) or a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict form.”). 
 16. See Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 863 (recognizing that the federal approach to the no-
impeachment rule allowed juror “testimony about events extraneous to the deliberative process 
such as reliance on outside evidence” like newspapers and dictionaries or personal investigation of 
the facts); United States v. Duncan, 598 F.2d 839, 866 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871 
(1979) (recognizing a jury’s unauthorized use of a dictionary is misconduct but not prejudicial per 
se); United States v. Williams-Davis, 821 F. Supp. 727, 740 (D.D.C. 1993) (recognizing a juror’s 
unauthorized visit to a crime scene is extraneous information under Federal Rule of Evidence 
606(b)); In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 695 F.2d 207, 213 (6th Cir. 1982) (recognizing that 
juror experiment is extraneous information under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)). 
 17. Wright v. Ill. & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195, 212 (Iowa 1866). 
 18. McQuarrie, 380 S.W.3d at 163–64. 
 19. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 863 (noting that the federal approach stayed closer to the 
original Mansfield rule than the Iowa rule). 
 20. Id. (characterizing the Iowa rule as a flexible version of the no-impeachment rule). 
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for post-verdict juror testimony that racial bias was a factor in jury 
deliberations.21  
III.  THE NEW BATSON: EXTENDING PEÑA-RODRIGUEZ TO CIVIL CASES IN 
FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 
A. The Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado Decision 
Prior to Peña-Rodriguez, each jurisdiction considered whether to make an 
exception to the no-impeachment rule for juror testimony about a juror’s alleged 
racial bias expressed during deliberations. The Peña-Rodriguez Court held that 
where a juror clearly states or indicates that he or she relied on racial stereotypes 
or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment jury trial 
guarantee requires that a trial court consider the juror’s statement and any 
resulting denial of such guarantee to the criminal defendant.22 After Peña-
Rodriguez, federal criminal defendants and state criminal defendants are now 
entitled to impeach a jury’s verdict with juror testimony about a juror’s alleged 
racial bias.23 The exception applies to state criminal defendants because the 
Fourteenth Amendment makes the Sixth Amendment applicable to the states.24 
While perhaps atypical, history is replete with instances where jurors have 
deliberated and then returned a verdict based on silly, improper, mischievous, 
and otherwise unfair reasons. Indeed, the origins of the Mansfield rule derived 
from a case where the jury came up with their verdict through a game of 
chance.25 Deciding a verdict through a game of chance is silliness and presents 
a result that presumably nobody would try to defend as “fair” in a generic sense. 
But there is nothing to do about this under the no-impeachment rule.26 In cases 
prior to Peña-Rodriguez, the Supreme Court had refused to recognize a Sixth 
Amendment right for criminal defendants to impeach a verdict based on clear 
flaws, irregularities, and misconduct in the jury decision-making process 
 
 21. Id. at 871 (appendix listing of the cases); Kittle v. United States, 65 A.3d 1144, 1154–56 
(D.C. 2013); State v. Brown, 62 A.3d 1099, 1110 (R.I. 2013); Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 
304 S.W.3d 81, 87–90 (Mo. 2010) (en banc); State v. Hidanovic, 747 N.W.2d 463, 472–74 (N.D. 
2008); State v. Santiago, 715 A.2d 1, 14–22 (Conn. 1998); Fisher v. State, 690 A.2d 917, 919–21, 
920 n.4 (Del. 1996); State v. Jackson, 912 P.2d 71, 80–81 (Haw. 1996); Powell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
652 So.2d 354, 357–58 (Fla. 1995); State v. Hunter, 463 S.E.2d 314, 316 (S.C. 1995); 
Commonwealth v. Laguer, 571 N.E.2d 371, 376 (Mass. 1991); Spencer v. State, 398 S.E.2d 179, 
184–85 (Ga. 1990); People v. Rukaj, 506 N.Y.S.2d 677, 679–80 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); After Hour 
Welding, Inc. v. Laneil Mgmt. Co., 324 N.W.2d 686, 689–91 (Wisc. 1982); State v. Callender, 297 
N.W.2d 744, 746 (Minn. 1980); Seattle v. Jackson, 425 P.2d 385, 389 (Wash. 1967); State v. Levitt, 
176 A.2d 465, 467–68 (N.J. 1961). 
 22. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869. 
 23. Id. at 871 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 24. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149–50 (1968). 
 25. Vaise v. Delaval, 1 T.R. 11, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785). 
 26. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 268 (1915). 
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because to do so would subject the jury system to a level of scrutiny it could 
simply not withstand.27 In Tanner v. United States, the Court denied a Sixth 
Amendment exception for evidence that some jurors were under the influence 
of drugs and alcohol during the trial.28 In Warger v. Shauers, the Court denied a 
Sixth Amendment exception for evidence that the jury foreperson had failed to 
disclose a pro-defendant bias during voir dire.29 In McDonald v. Pless, the Court 
denied an exception where the jury allegedly improperly calculated a damages 
award through compromise by averaging the numerical damages submitted by 
each member.30 
Distinguishing all of these cases, the Peña-Rodriguez majority reasoned that 
racial bias in the administration of criminal justice by juries is both wrong and 
systemically worse than other types of improper decision-making committed by 
juries in other cases.31 Although the sorts of jury behavior in Tanner, Warger, 
and McDonald were improper, they were anomalies and distinct from the sort of 
pernicious threat to the equal administration of justice posed by racial 
discrimination committed by jurors.32 In the prior cases, the Court stressed that 
sufficient safeguards existed to protect against improper jury conduct during 
deliberations and precluded the need for constitutional exceptions.33 For 
example, voir dire permits the court and attorneys to examine venire members 
for impartiality.34 Jurors can report misconduct by other jurors to the court 
before the verdict and judges can remedy the situation through additional 
instructions or perhaps dismissal of a juror and appointment of an alternate 
juror.35 Evidence of jury misconduct from nonjuror sources can be used to 
impeach the verdict even after the trial is over.36 Even so, the Peña-Rodriguez 
Court determined that these safeguards were not enough to avoid the creation of 
the exception for racial bias.37 Questions about racial attitudes or bias to venire 
members during voir dire could fail to disclose such bias, exacerbate any 
prejudice that does exist, and might in fact harm jury deliberations.38 According 
to the majority, an accusation of racial bias is more stigmatizing than other types 
of alleged jury misconduct and so jurors would be less inclined to report the 
alleged racial bias of other jurors during the deliberations.39 In the words of the 
 
 27. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 874, 884 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 28. 483 U.S. 107, 122, 125–26 (1987). 
 29. 135 S. Ct. 521, 529–30 (2014). 
 30. 238 U.S. at 265, 269. 
 31. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 865–68. 
 32. Id. at 868–69. 
 33. Id. at 866. 
 34. Id. 866, 868–69. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 866. 
 37. Id. at 868–69, 871. 
 38. Id. at 868–69. 
 39. Id. 
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Court, “it is one thing to accuse a fellow juror of having a personal experience 
that improperly influences her consideration of the case, as would have been 
required in Warger. It is quite another to call her a bigot.”40 At the end of the 
day, the Peña-Rodriguez majority concluded that a constitutional exception for 
post-verdict impeachment of criminal jury verdicts due to alleged racial bias by 
juries is needed “to prevent a systemic loss of confidence in jury verdicts, a 
confidence that is a central premise of the Sixth Amendment trial right.”41 
Justices Roberts, Alito, and Thomas, the dissenters in Peña-Rodriguez, 
disagreed with the Court’s holding.42 Justice Thomas looked to the common law 
history and found there was no common law right to impeach a verdict with juror 
testimony of juror misconduct at the time of the ratification of the Sixth 
Amendment in 1791 or the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.43 
Consequently, there was no constitutional basis for creating the racial bias 
exception.44 Justice Alito argued that the political process is the appropriate 
place to decide whether to adopt such an exception and noted that the federal 
procedure and the overwhelming majority of state jurisdictions have a strong no-
impeachment rule that does not provide for a racial bias exception.45 He pointed 
out the critical interests of finality and the promotion of freedom in juror 
discussions and decision-making advanced by a strong no-impeachment rule.46 
He criticized the majority’s failure to adequately explain how the safeguards to 
protect against juror misconduct in deliberations are less effective with respect 
to racial bias than with respect to other forms of misconduct.47 Moreover, he 
contended the majority’s holding provides no way to make appropriate 
distinctions between different types of juror misconduct or bias, some of which 
would implicate a party’s Sixth Amendment right and some of which would 
not.48 According to Justice Alito, the majority’s bottom line is the Constitution 
is less tolerant of racial bias than other forms of juror misconduct.49 But he 
contended that neither the text or history of the Sixth Amendment, nor the nature 
of the right to an “impartial jury,” indicate that the protection provided by the 
Sixth Amendment is dependent on the type of jury partiality or bias.50 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869. 
 42. Id. at 871, 874 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 43. Id. at 874. 
 44. Id.at 871–74. 
 45. Id. at 877–78, 881 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 46. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 877 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 47. Id. at 879. 
 48. Id. at 883–84. 
 49. Id. at 882. 
 50. Id. 
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B. Extending Peña-Rodriguez to Civil Cases in Federal and State Courts 
Batson v. Kentucky could guide courts in determining whether Peña-
Rodriguez should be extended to hold that there is a constitutional exception to 
the no-impeachment rule for racial bias by jurors in civil cases.51 In Batson, the 
United States Supreme Court held in the context of a state criminal case that the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment is 
violated when a prosecutor uses a peremptory challenge against a juror on the 
basis of the venire member’s race.52 Batson involved a black defendant and 
black jurors who were struck because of their race.53 In Edmonson v. Leesville 
Concrete Co., the Court held that race-based peremptory challenges violate the 
equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in 
civil cases.54 In sum, Batson initially applied to criminal cases but was later 
extended to civil cases in Edmonson, and is grounded on the idea that race-based 
peremptory challenges violate the equal protection rights of the venire members 
who are excluded from jury service, and uses third-party standing rules to allow 
a defendant or civil litigant to raise the equal protection rights of an excluded 
juror.55 
There are striking similarities between Batson and Peña-Rodriguez. Both 
provide a narrow exception to a broad right. Both initially applied in the criminal 
context. Both initially applied to race. Therefore, Batson and its progeny is a 
potential model for the development of the Peña-Rodriguez constitutional 
exception and the extension of it to civil cases.  
From a big-picture perspective, there is a similarity between Batson and 
Peña-Rodriguez. There is a broad right for litigants to exercise peremptory 
challenges on venire members for whatever reason the litigants want, except 
Batson provides the narrow exception for race.56 Juries can generally go back to 
the jury deliberation room and come up with whatever decision they want, on 
 
 51. 476 U.S. 79, 104–05 (1986). 
 52. Id. at 89 (holding that while a prosecutor is generally entitled to exercise peremptory 
challenges on whatever basis the prosecutor wants, the Equal Protection Clause forbids the 
prosecutor from exercising peremptory challenges on the basis of race). 
 53. Id. at 82–83. 
 54. 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991). 
 55. For an application of third-party standing rules, see id. at 629, 631 (citing Powers v. Ohio, 
499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)). 
 56. A peremptory challenge is made to a venire member without assigning any reason. See 
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (“The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is 
that it is one exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the 
court’s control.”); 9B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE § 2483 (3d ed. 2008) (“No reason need be given for the use of a peremptory 
challenge.”). In federal civil cases, each party is entitled to three peremptory challenges. See FED. 
R. CIV. P. 47(b) (“The court must allow the number of peremptory challenges provided by 28 
U.S.C. § 1870.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (2012) (“In civil cases, each party shall be entitled to three 
peremptory challenges.”); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986). 
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whatever basis they want, and it cannot be constitutionally impeached after the 
verdict is entered except under Peña-Rodriguez when the decision is based on 
racial bias.57 
The similarity does not end there. The heart of both the Peña-Rodriguez and 
Batson decisions is really an equal protection concern, although Peña-Rodriguez 
is framed in the context of the Sixth Amendment58 and Batson is framed more 
in the context of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment than the 
Sixth Amendment.59 Race discrimination in the context of the administration of 
justice in the court system harms the community as a whole and undermines 
public confidence in the justice system in a systemic way, which is different 
from other forms of jury misconduct during deliberations.60 According to both 
decisions, the resulting systemic and public harm is what makes race 
discrimination so pernicious and worthy of differential treatment from otherwise 
categorically broad rules—litigants strike venire members for whatever reason 
and juries make decisions on whatever basis deemed appropriate even if the 
reasons do not seem justifiable—that do not generally receive other 
exceptions.61 Compare language from Batson with language from the Peña-
Rodriguez majority and Peña-Rodriguez dissent. 
From Batson: 
The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted 
on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community. Selection 
procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine 
public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice. Discrimination within 
the judicial system is most pernicious because it is a stimulant to that race 
prejudice which is an impediment to securing to black citizens that equal justice 
which the law aims to secure to all others.62 
From the Peña-Rodriguez majority: 
All forms of improper bias pose challenges to the trial process. But there is a 
sound basis to treat racial bias with added precaution. A constitutional rule that 
racial bias in the justice system must be addressed—including, in some 
 
 57. See Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 529 (2014); Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 
125 (1987); McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 265–67 (1915). 
 58. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017) (“[W]here a juror makes a clear 
statement that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal 
defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule give way in order to permit 
the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror’s statement and any resulting denial of the jury 
trial guarantee.”). 
 59. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 (noting that peremptory challenges are subject to commands of the 
Equal Protection Clause and that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits peremptory challenges on 
the basis of race in criminal cases). 
 60. Id. at 87. 
 61. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869; Batson, 476 U.S. at 87–89. 
 62. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87–88 (emphasis added). 
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instances, after the verdict has been entered—is necessary to prevent a systemic 
loss of confidence in jury verdicts, a confidence that is a central premise of the 
Sixth Amendment trial right.63 
From the Peña-Rodriguez dissent: 
The real thrust of the majority opinion is that the Constitution is less tolerant 
of racial bias than other forms of juror misconduct, but it is hard to square this 
argument with the nature of the Sixth Amendment right on which petitioner’s 
argument and the Court’s holding are based.64 
1. The Civil Case Originating in Federal District Court 
With all of this in mind, civil cases in federal district court will start to arise 
where, after a jury verdict is entered, the losing civil litigant will attempt to 
secure affidavits from one of the jurors stating that, during jury deliberations, 
another juror expressed racial bias. Under one of the applicable forms of the no-
impeachment rule, the trial judge may be inclined to simply rule that the verdict 
cannot be impeached through testimony about what occurred during 
deliberations. But, after Batson and Peña-Rodriguez, attorneys now have an 
opportunity to argue that a constitutional exception for jurors’ racial bias now 
applies in the context of civil cases that the judge must follow. 
There are two ways to look at this argument. First, the argument in favor of 
rejecting a constitutional exception for racial bias by jurors in civil cases focuses 
on limiting Peña-Rodriguez to the Sixth Amendment and highlighting the 
distinction between criminal cases and civil cases. The Sixth Amendment 
provides in relevant part that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . .”65 A civil litigant 
bringing a case in federal court and arguing for a constitutional racial bias 
exception to the no-impeachment rule cannot rely on the Sixth Amendment 
because the Sixth Amendment does not apply in civil cases.66 The litigant will 
have to rely on some other constitutional provision. 
The civil litigant in federal court may initially hang his hat on the Seventh 
Amendment for purposes of the jury trial right. The Seventh Amendment 
guarantees the jury trial right to civil litigants in federal court where the cause 
 
 63. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869 (emphasis added). 
 64. Id. at 882 (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 65. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to 
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed 
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for 
his defense.”). 
 66. Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 441 (2011) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment does not govern 
civil cases.”). 
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of action is based on a claim that existed at common law. However, there is no 
specific language in the Seventh Amendment that guarantees a racial bias 
exception to the no-impeachment rule.67 Nor does the nature of the Seventh 
Amendment compel this conclusion. One could say as a general matter that a 
central premise of the Seventh Amendment is public confidence in civil jury 
verdicts that are free from the taint of racial bias by jury decision-making, just 
like the Peña-Rodriguez majority stated is the case in the context of the Sixth 
Amendment.68 But that idea seems more appropriately connected to a 
generalized concept of racial bias in juror decision-making being more harmful 
than other forms of juror misconduct in jury decision-making under equal 
protection principles. The actual language of the Seventh Amendment focuses 
on the civil jury trial right being tied to “suits at common law.”69 This provides 
even further justification for the type of historical argument made by Justice 
Thomas in his Peña-Rodriguez dissent regarding the Sixth Amendment and the 
common law no-impeachment rule.70 At the time of the Seventh Amendment 
ratification in the 1700s the common law did not allow a litigant to impeach a 
verdict with jury testimony of jury misconduct.71 This tying of the “common 
law” language in the Seventh Amendment to the historical point made by Justice 
Thomas regarding the actual common law rule at the time of ratification, makes 
the argument for the racial bias constitutional exception in civil cases even less 
persuasive from a textual and historical perspective than the exception for 
criminal cases. 
Litigants arguing against extending Peña-Rodriguez to civil cases could also 
highlight fundamental distinctions between criminal cases and civil cases. 
Criminal cases involve the defendant’s life and liberty. Civil cases typically 
focus on money damages between parties. For this reason, different procedural 
rules apply, such as the beyond a reasonable doubt burden of persuasion standard 
in criminal cases and the preponderance of the evidence burden of persuasion 
standard in civil cases. Refusing to extend the racial bias exception is just 
another line to draw between criminal and civil cases. This is a familiar refrain: 
criminal and civil cases are just different and therefore different rules apply. 
Second, the argument for extending Peña-Rodriguez to civil cases brought 
in federal district court should focus on equal protection principles, which apply 
in both criminal and civil cases. Indeed, Justice Alito’s dissent forcefully 
explains how the majority’s decision is less about the Sixth Amendment and 
 
 67. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall 
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall 
be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the 
common law.”). 
 68. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869. 
 69. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (emphasis added). 
 70. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 871–74 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 71. Id. at 872. 
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more about equal protection based on race.72 Viewed in this way, the winning 
argument for extending Peña-Rodriguez to civil cases brought in federal district 
court is equal protection under the Fifth Amendment. This argument merely 
takes a page right out of the Batson and Edmonson playbook. 
A court considering extending Peña-Rodriguez to civil cases could easily 
follow the extension of Batson to civil cases as illustrated by the Edmonson 
decision. In Edmonson, the civil plaintiff claimed racial discrimination in a 
peremptory challenge by the opposing party.73 The civil case was brought in 
federal district court and so the Seventh Amendment jury trial right attached.74 
The Edmonson Court held that race-based peremptory challenges violate the 
equal protection rights of the challenged jurors in civil cases just like the Batson 
Court said they do in criminal cases.75 Because the case was in federal court and 
concerned the federal government, the Court based its holding on the equal 
protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause76 instead 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, as in Batson.77 If Peña-Rodriguez is really more 
about equal protection based on race than the Sixth Amendment,78 it would 
make sense when the juror racial bias issue in a civil case arises to simply follow 
the logic of Edmonson and create the constitutional exception to the no-
impeachment rule for juror bias in civil cases under the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment. 
Peña-Rodriguez is perhaps even easier to extend to civil cases than Batson 
was because Batson’s peremptory challenge issue had the complicated question 
of whether peremptory challenges by private litigants concern state action. The 
Edmonson Court ruled that a private litigant’s use of peremptory challenges 
constituted state action and was therefore subject to equal protection.79 The juror 
racial bias situation is more straightforward from a state action perspective than 
peremptory challenges. The actor in the alleged jury racial bias is the jury and 
not a private litigant. The alleged equal protection deprivation flows from the 
jury. The jury is a quintessential government body.80 The jury’s authority 
derives from the power of the court and ultimately from the government that 
 
 72. Id. at 878–84 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 73. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616–17 (1991). 
 74. Id. at 616. 
 75. Id. at 616–18. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 879 (1986). 
 78. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 878–84 (2017) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 79. State action occurred in Edmonson because the peremptory challenge right has its source 
in state authority, the peremptory challenge system could not exist absent governmental oversight 
and authority, and the selection of jurors is a governmental function even if in the peremptory 
challenges context the government delegates a portion of that authority to private litigants. 
Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 619–28. 
 80. Id. at 624. 
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confers jurisdiction on the court.81 In short, viewing juries as state actors seems 
even less of a stretch than viewing a private litigant as a state actor. Furthermore, 
Batson and Edmonson had to consider the standing issue of parties to the case 
raising the equal protection rights of jurors.82 The standing issue is not 
implicated in a Peña-Rodriguez situation. If there is an equal protection violation 
in the racial bias by juror scenario, the violation is against the litigant and the 
litigant is raising the violation to protect his or her own rights and has standing. 
The Supreme Court has gone to great lengths to focus on the unique nature 
of racial bias and the importance of constitutional requirements to try and root 
out racial bias in the criminal justice system through the Batson and Peña-
Rodriguez exceptions.83 Is there any less of a policy reason for taking the same 
approach in civil juries than is now done in criminal cases? What would the 
principled argument be for making a distinction beyond a generalized idea that 
criminal trials and civil trials have some differences? Jury decisions free from 
racial bias are wanted in civil cases just like they are in criminal cases; this 
underlying interest applies in both systems.84 The systemic and public 
confidence statements from both the Peña-Rodriguez and Batson Courts fit just 
as well with the administration of justice by civil juries as they do with the 
administration of justice by criminal juries.85 
The critical decision involving the creation of a constitutional exception to 
the no-impeachment rule on the basis of racial bias by jurors during deliberations 
is whether to actually open the door at all and create the exception in the first 
place. The Supreme Court opened the door and created the exception.86 But after 
the door is cracked open to the exception on the criminal side it seems difficult 
to justify keeping it shut on the civil side. It is only a matter of time for the 
exception to become entrenched in civil cases brought in federal court. 
2. The Civil Case Originating in State Courts 
Like the federal civil cases, civil cases in state trial courts will start to arise 
where after a jury verdict is entered, the losing civil litigant will attempt to secure 
 
 81. Id. (“[The jury] is a quintessential governmental body, having no attributes of a private 
actor. The jury exercises the power of the court and of the government that confers the court’s 
jurisdiction.”). 
 82. Id. at 628–30. The Edmonson Court ruled in favor of the litigant’s standing to raise equal 
protection rights of the excluded juror. Id. 
 83. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869; Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87–88 (1986). 
 84. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 630 (“Civil juries, no less than their criminal counterparts, must 
follow the law and act as impartial factfinders. And, as we have observed, their verdicts, no less 
than those of their criminal counterparts, become binding judgments of the court. Racial 
discrimination has no place in the courtroom, whether the proceeding is civil or criminal. Congress 
has so mandated by prohibiting various discriminatory acts in the context of both civil and criminal 
trials. The Constitution demands nothing less.” (citation omitted)). 
 85. Id.; Batson, 476 U.S. at 87. 
 86. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869. 
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affidavits from one of the jurors stating that during jury deliberations another 
juror expressed racial bias. Under the applicable state law version of the no-
impeachment rule, the trial judge may be inclined to simply rule that the verdict 
cannot be impeached through testimony about what occurred during 
deliberations. Like civil cases in the federal district court, attorneys now have an 
opportunity to argue that a federal constitutional exception for racial bias by 
jurors applies in the context of civil cases that the judge must follow. 
If a state civil court considers Peña-Rodriguez as limited to the Sixth 
Amendment, the state civil court will have no obligation to apply the exception 
as a matter of federal constitutional law because the Sixth Amendment applies 
only to criminal cases not to civil cases.87 The Seventh Amendment jury trial 
right only applies to civil cases in federal courts and not civil cases in state 
courts.88 So the Seventh Amendment is irrelevant to the juror racial bias 
exception in state civil court. State jurisdictions have their own constitutional 
provisions concerning the jury trial right.89 Ultimately, a state supreme court 
would be able to analyze whether the juror racial bias exception to the no-
impeachment rule should apply to civil cases in their state in the context of their 
own procedural rules, evidentiary rules, and constitutional provisions on the jury 
trial right. But if the federal courts (and ultimately the United States Supreme 
Court) hold that the exception is applicable in civil cases under equal protection, 
then a state supreme court would presumably be constrained to apply the 
exception to civil cases in their state courts. Such decisions would follow the 
pattern of state appellate courts adopting the racial bias peremptory challenge 
exception to civil cases in state courts after the United States Supreme Court 
decided Edmonson.90 Once again, Batson and Edmonson are the models for the 
 
 87. Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 441 (2011) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment does not govern 
civil cases.”). 
 88. See Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 80 (1989) (White, J., dissenting); 
Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916) (“Seventh Amendment 
applies only to proceedings in courts of the United States and does not in any manner whatever 
govern or regulate trials by jury in state courts or the standards which must be applied concerning 
the same.”). 
 89. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16 (“Trial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured to all, but 
in a civil cause three-fourths of the jury may render a verdict.”); ME. CONST. art. I, § 20 (“In all 
civil suits, and in all controversies concerning property, the parties shall have a right to a trial by 
jury, except in cases where it has heretofore been otherwise practiced . . . .”); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 
25 (“In all controversies at law respecting property, the ancient mode of trial by jury is one of the 
best securities of the rights of people, and shall remain sacred and inviolable.”); N.M. CONST. art. 
II, § 12 (“The right of trial by jury as it has heretofore existed shall be secured to all and remain 
inviolate.”); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 5 (“The right of trial by jury be inviolate, except that, in civil 
cases, laws may be passed to authorize the rendering of a verdict by the concurrence of not less 
than three-fourths of the jury.”). 
 90. See Bustos v. City of Clovis, 365 P.3d 67, 75 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015) (recognizing the 
application of the Edmonson exception to civil cases in New Mexico state courts); Wingate Taylor-
Maid Transp., Inc. v. Baker, 840 S.W.2d 179, 182 (Ark. 1992) (recognizing that the Edmonson 
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application of Peña-Rodriguez and the future line of civil cases applying the jury 
racial bias exception. 
IV.  THE NEW BATSON: EXTENDING PEÑA-RODRIGUEZ TO OTHER FORMS OF 
JUROR BIAS BEYOND RACE 
Justice Alito provided a telling insight in his Peña-Rodriguez dissent. He 
explains that if the Peña-Rodriguez decision is based on equal protection (as 
opposed to the Sixth Amendment), expressions of juror bias based on suspect 
classifications such as national origin, religion, sex, and First Amendment 
freedoms of association and expression would merit equal treatment with cases 
of racial bias by jurors.91 And he goes on to further state that “convicting a 
defendant on the basis of any irrational classification would violate the Equal 
Protection clause.”92 If this is correct and equal protection is really the driving 
force underlying the Peña-Rodriguez decision, then Batson returns yet again as 
a model for the development of Peña-Rodriguez law in both criminal and civil 
cases.93 The Peña-Rodriguez door is open to Batson-type arguments in terms of 
broadening the characteristics of post-trial protection against juror bias during 
deliberations to include sex, national origin, religion, disability, sexual 
orientation, and age, among other possible characteristics.94 The United States 
Supreme Court extended Batson to ethnicity and gender.95 Courts have 
considered Batson protection for other “cognizable” groups or classifications.96 
 
exception applies to civil cases in Arkansas state courts); Washington v. Goodman, 830 S.W.2d 
398, 400–02 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992) (recognizing that the Edmonson exception applies to civil cases 
in Kentucky courts); Dedeaux v. J.I. Case Co., 611 So. 2d 880, 883 (Miss. 1992) (recognizing the 
application of the Edmonson exception to civil cases in Mississippi state courts); Powers v. 
Palacios, 813 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. 1991) (recognizing the application of the Edmonson exception 
to civil cases in Texas state courts). 
 91. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 883–84 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. (“Recasting this as an equal protection case would not provide a ground for limiting 
the holding to cases involving racial bias. At a minimum, cases involving bias based on any suspect 
classification—such as national origin or religion—would merit equal treatment. So, I think, would 
bias based on sex, or the exercise of the First Amendment right to freedom of expression or 
association. Indeed, convicting a defendant on the basis of any irrational classification would 
violate the Equal Protection Clause.” (citations omitted)). 
 95. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 143 (1994) (gender); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 
352, 355, 362 (1991) (ethnicity). 
 96. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995) (reasoning that long, unkept hair is not a 
characteristic of race); United States v. Heron, 721 F.3d 896, 902 (7th Cir. 2013) (declining to 
recognize a Batson challenge based on a juror’s religiosity); United States v. Iron Moccasin, 878 
F.2d 226, 229 (8th Cir. 1989) (reasoning that Native Americans are a cognizable racial group); 
United States v. Biaggi, 853 F.2d 89, 95–96 (2d Cir. 1988) (reasoning that Italian-Americans are a 
cognizable racial group). 
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Courts would likely consider granting Peña-Rodriguez protection to gender and 
other suspect classifications in a similar way. 
V.  THE NEW BATSON: TRIAL PROCEDURES AFTER PEÑA-RODGRIUEZ 
Trial procedures will change in three ways in light of Peña-Rodriguez. First, 
jurisdictions will take steps to stress to jurors the importance of raising 
allegations of racial bias to the judge before the jury is discharged. Second, 
jurisdictions will develop frameworks for determining whether statements of 
racial bias by jurors during deliberations influenced the verdict such that a new 
trial is warranted. Third, jurisdictions will modify their procedures for post-
verdict contact with jurors. 
A. Model Jury Instructions 
It is more efficient for courts to address allegations of racial bias by jurors 
during the trial than after the trial is over. If an allegation of racial bias by jurors 
is brought to the trial court’s attention during the jury deliberation process, the 
trial court can remedy the bias by including supplemental jury instructions that 
remind jurors of the duty not to discriminate because of race, dismissing the 
biased jurors, and appointing alternate jurors.97 The trial judge could then order 
the jury to continue with their deliberations and not necessarily grant a new trial. 
If an allegation of an expression of racial bias by jurors during deliberations is 
raised by a juror after the trial is over and it influenced the verdict, the remedy 
is a new trial.98 Consequently, Peña-Rodriguez will incentivize jurisdictions to 
incorporate model juror instructions whereby judges consistently remind jurors 
that race must play no part in the jury’s decision-making process and encourage 
jurors to report allegations of racial bias as soon as they arise and not wait to 
report them until after the trial is over.99 It seems plausible that such jury 
instructions would increase the likelihood that jurors report expressions of racial 
 
 97. See State v. Tennors, 923 So. 2d 823, 833 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (“La. Code Crim.P. art. 789 
permits replacement of a juror with an alternate juror when the juror is physically unable to serve, 
or when the juror is found to have become disqualified, or to have either the real or potential for 
bias in the deliberations.” (emphasis added)). 
 98. See Powell v. Allstate Insurance Co., 652 So. 2d 354, 358 (Fla. 1995) (deciding that a new 
trial must be ordered if the trial court determines that racial statements were made by jurors during 
jury deliberations). 
 99. Courts already frequently instruct juries that “bias” should play no part in the jury’s 
decision-making process. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. Civ. 700 (“In reaching your verdict, do not let 
bias, sympathy, prejudice, public opinion or any other sentiment for or against any party to 
influence your decision.”); Walton v. City of Manchester, 666 A.2d 978, 980 (N.H. 1995) (noting 
that the trial court instructed jury not to decide facts on the basis of any “sympathy, prejudice, bias,” 
which was in line with standard New Hampshire civil jury instructions); State v. Moen, 786 P.2d 
111, 137 (Or. 1990) (approving jury instruction cautioning the jury to disregard “bias or prejudice” 
for or against the state, the victims, and defendant). 
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bias by fellow jurors during deliberations before the jury signs its verdict.100 The 
instructions will also hopefully discourage jurors from making such statements 
during deliberations. 
B. Procedures and Standard for Granting a New Trial Due to Racial Bias 
During Jury Deliberations 
The Peña-Rodriguez Court declined to decide what procedures a trial court 
must follow when a defendant files a post-verdict motion for new trial based on 
juror testimony of racial bias.101 The Court also failed to decide the appropriate 
standard for determining when racial bias is enough to grant a new trial.102 But 
these are certainly practical issues that all jurisdictions will have to deal with in 
the near future. 
The motion for new trial procedure alleging racial bias in jury decision-
making should be tailored to each jurisdiction. But one approach would be to 
initially require the motion for new trial to be supported by the affidavit of the 
juror describing the alleged racial bias. The trial court could then evaluate the 
affidavit to decide whether to hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion.103 Live 
testimony from the juror(s) alleging racial bias and other jurors who could 
corroborate or dispute the allegation would be helpful—and perhaps even 
required—because the trial court’s ruling on the motion would be affected by 
credibility determinations of the witnesses.104 
The standard for granting a new trial could vary between two extremes: (1) 
evidence of a racially biased statement in the jury deliberation room could result 
in a new trial;105 or (2) proof that racial bias played a motivating causal role in 
 
 100. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 870–71 (2017). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Kittle v. United States, 65 A.3d 1144, 1157 (D.C. 2013) (reasoning that the trial court did 
not err or abuse discretion in declining to hold a hearing on racial bias allegation and admit juror 
testimony because statements did not indicate racial bias affected the jury’s verdict); State v. 
Brown, 62 A.3d 1099, 1110–11 (R.I. 2013) (upholding the trial court’s decision not to hold an 
evidentiary hearing on racial bias allegation because evidence of racial bias was ambiguous); State 
v. Jackson, 912 P.2d 71, 80 (Haw. 1996) (reasoning that the trial court has no duty to interrogate 
the jury until the defendant makes a prima facie showing that improper comments were used against 
the defendant). 
 104. Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., P.C., 304 S.W.3d 81, 89 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) (discussing 
that an evidentiary hearing should be required when a motion for a new trial alleges statements 
reflecting racial bias were made by a juror during deliberations); State v. Santiago, 715 A.2d 1, 21 
(Conn. 1998) (discussing that testimony should be sought from juror reporting alleged prejudicial 
comments, jurors who could corroborate or dispute the allegations, and the juror alleged to have 
made the prejudicial comments). 
 105. Fleshner, 304 S.W.3d at 89–90 (discussing that upon a finding by the trial court that 
racially biased or prejudicial statements were made, the trial court should grant a new trial); United 
States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1121 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that racial bias or prejudice of a single 
juror could result in a new trial). 
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the verdict of the jury overall could be required.106 It seems preferable for trial 
courts to evaluate whether any expression of racial bias by a juror meaningfully 
affected the jury’s verdict because there could be cases where the evidence 
demonstrates that other jurors expressly rejected a fellow juror’s racially biased 
comments and that race discrimination ended up playing no role in the jury’s 
verdict.107 Factors to consider in deciding whether to grant the motion for new 
trial could include the statements themselves, the number of jurors exposed to 
the statements, jurors’ responses to the statements, the strength of the admitted 
evidence supporting the verdict, and any other matters which might have a 
bearing on how the statements affected or influenced the jury.108 Whether the 
facts rise to the applicable standard will require a fact-specific analysis by a trial 
court. Appellate courts would likely give considerable deference to the trial 
courts that make this judgment call.109 
Batson-type frameworks for evaluating alleged racial comments and the 
effect of the racial bias in the jury verdict are conceivable. In Batson, the focus 
is on whether the challenged party made a peremptory challenge for race or 
because of some other reason.110 In Peña-Rodriguez, the focus is on whether the 
jury based its verdict on race or for some other reason.111 In Batson, the United 
States Supreme Court developed a three-part burden-shifting framework to 
ascertain whether a party’s peremptory challenge was really based on race or 
some other reason.112 Under this framework, the party alleging a race-based 
peremptory challenge has to make a prima facie case of discrimination.113 If this 
happens, the burden of production shifts to the challenged party to introduce 
evidence of a neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge.114 If this burden 
 
 106. State v. Hidanovic, 747 N.W.2d 463, 470 (N.D. 2008) (finding that the district court must 
decide under an objective standard whether there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict of a 
hypothetical average juror would be affected by the racial comments); After Hour Welding, Inc. v. 
Laneil Mgmt. Co., 324 N.W.2d 686, 691 (Wis. 1982) (finding that the trial judge is required to 
determine whether statements were made and then evaluate their probable effect upon a 
hypothetical average jury). 
 107. In Peña-Rodriguez, the Supreme Court indicated that judicial inquiry into the racial bias 
is triggered when the racially biased statements “tend to show that racial animus was a significant 
motivating factor in the juror’s vote to convict.” Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 
(2017). 
 108. Hidanovic, 747 N.W.2d at 470. 
 109. Santiago, 715 A.2d at 18 (discussing that the appellate court evaluates trial court’s decision 
on jury misconduct under an abuse of discretion standard); State v. Jackson, 912 P.2d 71, 81 (Haw. 
1996) (applying abuse of discretion standard to trial court’s decision to deny motion for new trial 
based on allegations of racial bias during deliberations). 
 110. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S 79, 82 (1986). 
 111. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 861–62. 
 112. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767–68 (1995); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 
358–59 (1991). 
 113. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358. 
 114. Id. at 358–59. 
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is satisfied, the challenging party must prove the stated legal reason is actually a 
pretext for unlawful race discrimination.115 Courts might apply a similar burden-
shifting framework in the context of Peña-Rodriguez. For example, the party 
that loses the verdict must make a prima facie case that a juror (or jurors) made 
statements of racial bias. If the losing party makes such a prima facie showing, 
the burden of production shifts to the winning party on the verdict to introduce 
evidence that racial bias did not affect the jury’s verdict. If this burden is 
satisfied, the losing party must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the racial bias did have a probable effect upon the jury’s verdict. Alternatively, 
once the losing party establishes a prima facie case of racial statements, the 
winning party attempting to protect the verdict must prove by the required 
standard of proof—preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing 
evidence, or beyond a reasonable doubt—that the juror’s racial comments could 
not have affected the verdict.116 Because of the desire to protect the defendant 
from an unfair trial, it seems probable that courts in criminal cases would tend 
to place the burden of proof upon the prosecution to show that—once racial bias 
by one juror has been established—racial bias did not affect the jury’s verdict.117 
C. Attorney Post-Verdict Contact with Jurors 
After a jury is discharged, jurors in both criminal cases and civil cases have 
always been free to talk to others about their jury service or to decline to do 
so.118 Attorneys who try a case are a category of individuals who have a special 
interest in learning about the juror’s perspective of the case and the reasons for 
their verdict. Attorneys may want to discuss the case with the jurors for 
educational purposes to learn something that will help in the future.119 But 
attorneys on the losing side may also want to initiate post-verdict contact with 
jurors to inquire about any potential misconduct from jurors to try and get a new 
trial.120 Federal rules, state professional rules of ethics, and local rules many 
times place limitations on attorneys’ opportunity to contact jurors after the trial 
 
 115. Id. at 359, 363–64. 
 116. In State v. Jackson, the Hawaii Supreme Court articulated a similar approach. 912 P.2d 
71, 80 (Haw. 1996). The defendant has the initial prima facie burden of showing that improper 
racial comments made by jurors were used against him or her. A presumption of prejudice then 
arises and the verdict is set aside unless the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
juror’s comments could not have affected the verdict. Id. at 80. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Fla. Std. Jury Instr. Crim. 4.2 (“Although you are at liberty to speak with anyone about 
your deliberations, you are also at liberty to refuse to speak to anyone.”); TEX. R. CIV P. 226(a) 
(“Thank you for your verdict. I have told you that the only time you may discuss the case is with 
the other jurors in the jury room. I now release you from jury duty. Now you may discuss the case 
with anyone. But you may also choose not to discuss the case; that is your right.”). 
 119. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline v. Benton, 980 S.W.2d 425, 433 (Tex. 1998). 
 120. Hall v. State, 253 P.3d 716, 718–19 (Idaho 2011) (criminal defendant filed motion for 
post-verdict communications with jurors). 
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is over.121 Before Peña-Rodriguez, procuring a new trial based on juror 
statements made during deliberations was generally not going to be a basis for a 
new trial under the no-impeachment rule.122 But now with the Peña-Rodriguez 
exception, any limitations that prevent an attorney from initiating such a post-
trial question to jurors in criminal cases are going to have to be evaluated and 
perhaps modified in light of the Peña-Rodriguez decision.123 For example, 
stringent rules that prevent attorneys from speaking to jurors after the trial unless 
permitted by the court in exceptional circumstances and under considerable 
regulation may need to give way in the context of post-verdict contact that seeks 
to inquire with jurors about possible racial bias during the deliberations. After 
Peña-Rodriguez, criminal defense attorneys should presumably have some 
opportunity post-verdict to ask jurors about whether any racially biased 
statements were expressed during deliberations.124 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The United States Supreme Court cracked open the door of the jury 
deliberation room as a matter of Constitutional law in Peña-Rodriguez. Now that 
the door is open a little bit, it is not going to be shut. The question is whether 
courts are going to keep the door where it is or bust it wide open. There will be 
pressures to keep the door where it is because of the practical problems 
associated with increasing post-trial reconsiderations of jury verdicts. But equal 
protection principles are going to push the other way because of the desire for 
 
 121. Cuevas v. United States, 317 F.3d 751, 753 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that rules regulating 
parties’ post-trial contact with jurors are “quite common” and that most of the 94 federal district 
courts have rules regarding post-trial juror contact); Dall v. Coffin, 970 F.2d 964, 972 (1st Cir. 
1992) (“[T]his Circuit prohibits the post-verdict interview of jurors by counsel, litigants, or their 
agents except under the supervision of the district court, and then only in such extraordinary 
situations as are deemed appropriate. Permitting the unbridled interviewing of jurors could easily 
lead to their harassment, to the exploitation of their thought processes, and to diminished confidence 
in jury verdicts, as well as to unbalanced trial results depending unduly on the relative resources of 
the parties.” (quoting United States v. Kepreos, 759 F.2d 961, 967 (1st Cir. 1985))); Haeberle v. 
Tex. Int’l Airlines, 739 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1984) (“Federal courts have generally disfavored 
post-verdict interviewing of jurors.”); MISS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.5 (2011) (“A lawyer 
shall not . . . communicate with a juror or prospective juror after discharge of the jury if: (1) the 
communication is prohibited by law or court order; or (2) the juror has made known to the lawyer 
a desire not to communicate.”); Benjamin M. Lawsky, Limitations on Attorney Postverdict Contact 
with Jurors: Protecting the Criminal Jury and Its Verdict at the Expense of the Defendant, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 1950, 1980–51 (1994) (“Many of the federal district court local rules require a 
threshold showing of good cause, or the explicit prior approval of the court before attorneys may 
interview jurors. In many of the districts lacking such local rules, appellate courts have issued 
similar guidelines. These restrictions burden access to an excellent source of potentially admissible 
evidence of juror misconduct.” (citations omitted)). 
 122. See supra Part II. 
 123. See supra Part III. 
 124. See supra Parts II, III. 
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fundamental fairness and justice in our jury system at a systemic level and the 
need for public confidence in the jury system. Batson and its progeny will likely 
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